## Case Neg – Lynbrook Militarism Aff

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### DA – Deterrence

#### Nuclear submarine positioning deters multiple hotspots for conflict key part of the deterrence triad—survivability and secrecy are key. Revealing nuclear posture causes extinction and turns prolif

Mies 99 [Admiral Richard W. Mies (Commander in Chief, United States Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska), "The SSBN in National Security," Undersea Warfare, Vol. 2, No. 1, Fall 1999] AZ

Without fanfare and recognition, our ballistic missile submarines patrolled the oceans of the Cold War in silent vigil, undetected and invulnerable, ready to strike, to deter our adversaries, and reassure our allies. And just as quietly, they set the standard for strategic deterrence and became the dominant leg of our strategic deterrent triad - our "ultimate insurance policy." As Colin Powell said on the occasion of the completion of the strategic submarine force's 3,000th patrol by USS Tennessee (SSBN-734), "…the Cold War was won especially by…America's Blue and Gold crews manning America's nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine fleet…no one has done more to prevent conflict, no one has made a greater sacrifice for the cause of Peace, than… America's proud missile submarine family. You stand tall among all our heroes of the Cold War." Today, the Cold War has been over for a decade, and in its wake we have emerged as the only true superpower in the international arena. At the same time, the world has changed dramatically since the fall of the Berlin Wall. The predictable, monolithic world we once faced has now been replaced by a multi-polar world of greater uncertainty - uncertainty in the hills of the Balkans, the streets of Somalia, the deserts of Iraq, and the bunkers of North Korea. And despite our singular superpower status, we find ourselves in a world of more diverse, asymmetric threats. Strategic Nuclear Policy Deterrence of both aggression and coercion is a cornerstone of our national security strategy. Our strategic nuclear forces serve as the most visible and important element of our commitment to this principle. Although the risk of massive nuclear attack has decreased significantly, and the role of nuclear weapons in our national military strategy has diminished, deterrence of major military attack on the United States and its allies, especially attacks involving weapons of mass destruction, remains our highest defense priority. Our National security strategy reaffirms that: "Nuclear weapons serve as a hedge against an uncertain future, a guarantee of our security commitments to allies, and a disincentive to those who would contemplate developing or otherwise acquiring their own nuclear weapons." - A National Security Strategy for a New Century, 1998 Strategic Deterrence in the Post-Cold War Environment As outlined in our National Military Strategy, although our Nation is at peace and the Cold War has ended, there remain a number of potentially serious threats to national security, including regional dangers, asymmetric challenges, transnational threats, and "wild cards." Russia still possesses, and continues to modernize, their substantial strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces. Because of the deterioration of their conventional forces and severe economic turmoil, Russia has placed increased reliance on nuclear weapons. Russia has made great progress toward creation of a stable democracy, but that transition is not assured. Hence our strategic forces serve as a hedge against the possibility of Russia's reemergence as a threat to the U.S. and its allies. Although China possesses a much smaller nuclear force, it is modernizing its strategic forces, and we cannot discount the emergence of China as a potential threat. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery pose the greatest threat to global stability and security and the greatest challenge to strategic deterrence. The issue may not be whether weapons of mass destruction will be used against the West by a rogue nation or transnational actor, but where and when. Accordingly, our present strategic force's mission reflects continuity with the past: "To deter major military attack on the United States and its allies; and if deterrence fails, to employ forces," while simultaneously providing support to the geographic Commanders-in-Chief for countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of their delivery. Strategic Force Structure To deter a broad range of threats, our National Security Strategy requires a robust triad of strategic forces. Both the Nuclear Posture Review and the Quadrennial Defense Review have reaffirmed the wisdom of preserving a complementary strategic triad of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, strategic bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Each leg of the triad contributes unique attributes that enhance deterrence and reduce risk: Intercontinental ballistic missiles provide prompt response, bombers provide flexibility, and submarines provide survivability. Together they comprise a robust deterrent that complicates a potential adversary's offensive and defensive planning. The triad is also a synergistic force that provides protection against the failure of any single one of its legs. Ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) will continue to carry the largest portion of our strategic power, regardless of whether they are subject to START I or START II treaty ceilings. With approximately two-thirds of the force at sea at any one time, the SSBN force is the most survivable leg of the triad, providing the United States with a powerful, assured, retaliatory capability against any adversary. Submarines at sea are stabilizing; by contrast, submarines in port are more vulnerable and could offer an extremely lucrative target in time of crisis. Thus, in any foreseeable arms control scenario, the United States must preserve a large enough SSBN force to enable two-ocean operations, with sufficient assets to ensure a retaliatory force at sea capable of dissuading any adversary in a crisis. Because the Russian Duma has failed to ratify the START II treaty, we have a Congressional mandate to maintain our strategic forces at START I levels. At the same time, the TRIDENT I, C4 missile is already beyond its design service life and can only be sustained at substantial cost and considerable risk to the middle of the next decade. Consequently, we have recently sought Congressional authority to transition the strategic submarine commitment from an 18-boat, mixed-missile force to a 14-boat, all TRIDENT II, D5 missile force. Backfit of four TRIDENT submarines to carry the D5 missile is the most cost-effective means to ensure a reliable sea-based deterrent well into the next century. A modernized 14-boat, two ocean, all D5 missile force is in many ways a more robust, credible, and reliable deterrent than the present 18-boat force. Our strategic forces, particularly our strategic submarines, are postured to provide an assured response capability to inflict unacceptable damage to a potential enemy. Our strategic plans provide a wide range of options to ensure our Nation can react appropriately to any provocation, rather than being limited to an "all or nothing" response. Additionally, our forces are postured such that we have the capability to respond promptly to any attack, without relying upon "launch on warning" or "launch under attack." The high flexibility, survivability, and diversity of our strategic forces are designed to complicate any adversary's offensive and defensive planning calculations. With the end of the Cold War, the United States has changed dramatically our strategic force posture: Our strategic forces no longer target other countries during normal peacetime operations. Our strategic bombers and their supporting tankers have not been on alert since 1991. Our Strategic Submarine Force, while positioned at sea for survivability, patrols under more relaxed and flexible conditions of alertness. Strategic Force Reductions From an historical perspective, the end of the Cold War has brought dramatic change to our strategic forces. Cooperative threat reduction, arms control, Presidential initiatives, and numerous confidence-building measures have brought about many positive developments in the strategic postures of the U.S. and Russia. Since the end of the Cold War, we have reduced our strategic nuclear systems by over 50 percent and non-strategic nuclear systems by over 75 percent. We have reduced the number of people involved in our strategic forces by approximately one-half and the number of military bases supporting them by approximately 60 percent. While overall defense spending has declined roughly 11 percent since the end of the Cold War, strategic force costs have dropped from eight percent of DoD's total obligation authority in 1990 to less than three percent today. This represents a pretty good "peace dividend" and a cost-effective premium on our Nation's "ultimate insurance policy." These changes also reflect a new, constructive relationship between the United States and Russia - a relationship in which stability is a central consideration. Stability is the most important criterion to satisfy as we proceed down the glide slope to lower numbers of nuclear weapons. Dr. Thomas Schelling, a noted writer on international strategic matters has written: "The dimension of 'strength' is an important one, but so is the dimension of 'stability' - the assurance against being caught by surprise, the safety in waiting, the absence of a premium on jumping the gun." Because of their stabilizing attributes of survivability and assured response, strategic submarines will play an increasingly prominent role in future START environments. Both the Nuclear Posture Review and Quadrennial Defense Review reaffirmed the importance of 14 TRIDENT SSBNs each equipped with 24 D5 missiles as a part of the START II-compliant nuclear force structure. These capital ships will form the backbone of the Nation's strategic nuclear force well into the 21st century. The SSBN Contribution: Survivable Deterrence The TRIDENT submarine provides a formidable array of capabilities to the National Command Authorities (NCA). As previously mentioned, these ships are the most survivable leg of the triad. Additionally, TRIDENT submarines provide unsurpassed reliability. To date there have been nearly 3,500 SSBN patrols which account for almost 130,000 man-years spent on patrol; at the same time the D-5 missile system has established an unprecedented record of 85 consecutive successful test flights. In addition to survivability, several specific characteristics of this formidable platform make it an indispensable part of our Nation's triad: Responsiveness. Because of its survivability, the TRIDENT weapon system can be effective under any strategic scenario. SSBNs can provide a sufficiently prompt response to meet any required mission, but their attack can be delayed as desired. Because TRIDENT submarines cannot be preempted, they are inherently stabilizing. There is no need to "use them or lose them." Response is assured, thus providing a highly credible deterrent.

#### Readiness deters wars, creating a secure international order

Skelton 97 - Ike Skelton, U.S. Rep, Missouri, Congressional Record, 143 Cong Rec H 1897, \*H1898, April 29, 1997

So to respond to my colleagues who ask, what is the enemy,'' I say, true; today we cannot define precisely what the enemy is or will be. We can say, however, that we will fail in our responsibility in this Congress if, once again, we allow the armed forces to be unprepared for the enemies that may emerge. In fact, as I will argue today, a failure to support a strong military in the present historical circumstances would be even more unfortunate and more unforgivable than in the past for two reasons. First, today the United States is the only Nation able to protect the peace. In the past we were fortunate that allies were able, often by the narrowest of margins, to hold the line while we belatedly prepared for war. Bismarck once said: God protects fools, and the United States.'' Today, no one else is capable either of preventing conflict from arising in the first place, or of responding decisively if a major threat to the peace does occur. While I trust in God, I believe God has given us the tools we need to keep peace, and it is our task to use them wisely. Second, and perhaps most importantly, if we fail in our responsibility to maintain U.S. military power, the United States, and, indeed, the world as a whole, may lose an unprecedented opportunity to construct an era of relative peace that could last for many, many years. Today, our military strength is the foundation of a relatively secure international order in which small conflicts, though endemic and inevitable, will not decisively erode global stability. As such, our military strength is also a means of preventing the growth of one or more new powers that could, in time, constitute a threat to peace and evolve into the enemy we do not now foresee. Because of this, the very limited investment required to maintain our military strength, though somewhat larger than we are making right now, is disproportionately small compared to the benefits we, and the rest of the world, derive from it. My fellow Missourian, Harry S Truman, stated this clearly: We must be prepared to pay the price for peace, or assuredly we will pay the price of war.'' These two premises, that the United States alone is able to protect the peace, and that adequate, visible U.S. military power may prevent new enemies from arising in the future, are, it seems to me, the cornerstones of a sound strategy for the years to come.

### DA – Command of the Seas

#### US Naval power is key to maintain the seas as a geopolitical shock absorber – ensures conflicts stay limited, prevents terrorism, and fosters global coop that solves every conflict – decline would also cause China war

Robert C. Rubel 14, Dean of Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War College, “Navies and Economic Prosperity: The New Logic of Sea Power,” in Writing to Think: The Intellectual Journey of a Naval Career, p.60-68

Systems thinking recognizes the interdependency of the various elements that contribute to a system. If we understand and accept that the world has knitted itself together into a global system of commerce (and the necessary forms of collective security that accompany commerce), then we are prepared to recognize and acknowledge that a wide range of factors impinge upon and even govern the effectiveness and efficiency of each subsystem. Using this logic we can easily understand not only that resource extraction, manufacturing, consumption and transportation are inextricably integrated elements of the world economy, but also that the protection of one to the exclusion of the others is not rational. The system as a whole must be protected. While it is true that no single military service—or nation—has the capability to render holistic systemic protection it is also true that the effects of each one’s operations ripple throughout the system as a whole, either enhancing or diminishing its overall security.¶ For navies, then, it is not sufficient to think of their purpose only in terms of protecting shipping. Certainly, shipping must be protected, but if there is nothing to put in those ships, their transits, safe or not, are meaningless. Therefore, it is as important that manufacturing nodes and resource nodes be similarly protected and that efforts be made to protect and enhance the nations and societies that constitute these nodes, not to mention the nations and societies that consume their output. Thus we have an endto- end systemic-view of what we might call the “mission space” of navies. The better the system works—the more secure it is—the better the world’s prospects for economic prosperity. It does not work for just one nation. For the purposes of this discussion, the important point is that the flow of finance, goods, information, etc. must be sustained across the system. The flow can be interrupted by disrupting shipping (and air travel and the internet), but commercial shipping, at least, is not significantly threatened in today’s world. On the other hand, war among major powers, instability in resource areas and major terrorist attacks in consumption areas all could significantly disrupt the flow, with disastrous results for the world economy as well as international peace. Given the dependency of most pension plans on the growth in the value of securities, it is not inaccurate to say that the well-being of much of the world’s greying population is dependent upon the effective functioning of navies.¶ Having established the systemic context for the new syllogism, we can engage in some reductionism to sort out some individual factors that can help us identify particular naval capabilities that are needed, their magnitude and even their mode of application (strategy). In doing so, we will focus, naturally, on threats to the system, proceeding from the most to the least dire.¶ As intimated previously, war among major powers is potentially the most disruptive threat to the global system. When one considers the almost eighty-year global system “dark age” between the outbreak of the First World War and the end of the Cold War, the impact of major power war becomes obvious. It would be arrogant and facile to suggest that navies themselves can prevent such wars, but it should be noted that a naval arms race between Great Britain and Germany played no small part in the chain of events leading to 1914 and the perceived vulnerability of the U.S. fleet in Hawaii was a factor in the Japanese decision to attack in 1941. These two themes, naval arms races and perceived naval vulnerability, constitute factors that have continuing relevance in today’s systemic world.¶ Let us start with naval arms races. We must admit that nations build navies for a range of reasons beyond protection of merchant shipping. These may include the desire to protect a vulnerable coast line, deter depredations by other powers and even generate prestige. There is, perhaps, one element of Mahan’s syllogism that continues to be true: at a certain level of economic activity and wealth, nations start building navies. A capable, ocean-going navy is a sign that a nation has “arrived” as a major power. Whether such navy building is a herald of future war or is a politically neutral phenomenon is not clear, although the historical record is cause for concern. Today, China, Japan, India, Brazil and other nations are building navies. They each have their reasons, but the prospects that such building programmes will lead to suspicion, alarm, fear and ultimately war may depend very much on how the current leading navies and their parent nations proceed.¶ An important reason the world system has been able to stitch itself back together after the world wars is the military superiority of the United States. A liberal democratic trading nation, it has coupled this superiority with free trade policies to stimulate economic growth. Capital, goods and people can flow freely around the globe, generating systemic behaviour. A key element of American military superiority is command of the seas, a term denoting the inability of any other navy to impose a strategic defeat on the U.S. Navy on the high seas. It is this command, like that achieved by the Royal Navy in the nineteenth century, which helped create the necessary conditions for system formation. When it is lost, as it was in 1914 and 1941, the world fragments and falls into war.¶ The challenge becomes how to use command of the sea to manage or influence the emergence of other navies such that true naval arms races do not occur. The right way to do this is not completely clear but there appear to be several sure-fire losing strategies. The first is for the United States to start the arms race itself by reflexively viewing the emergence of the Chinese Navy or others as a threat. Policies and patterns of building and deployment based on alarm and fear will generate reciprocal responses in China and elsewhere. This is why CS21 does not mention China or any other nation by name, something often criticized by those with an alarmist bent. Among the ways the U.S. Navy can stimulate Chinese alarm is to openly consider interdiction of their seaborne commerce in exercises, war games or articles. Not only would this strengthen the hand of Chinese alarmists, but commerce interdiction would probably be infeasible on a number of counts anyway. Another good way to invoke this kind of reciprocal security dilemma is to link sea control and power projection. After the Cold War, the U.S. Navy focused so narrowly on power projection that it and some of its allied navies forgot how to talk about sea control.12 While progress has been made in this area, there is still a sense in the doctrine that U.S. forces will use land strikes to neutralize shore based antiaccess systems with sea control being an exercise in access generation that is prerequisite to projecting power ashore.13 One can imagine the effect such talk has on a nation like China that has suffered humiliation and exploitation from the sea at the hands of western nations. Already, the Chinese are reacting to the most recent U.S. concept of this ilk, Air-Sea Battle: “If the U.S. military develops Air-Sea Battle to deal with the [People’s Liberation Army], the PLA will be forced to develop anti-Air-Sea Battle.”14¶ A second way to increase the odds that navy building will lead to war is for the leading navies to allow vulnerabilities to emerge. The U.S. Navy did this in two ways during the 1930s and up to 1941. First, it was slow to recognize and accept that the bomb-carrying aircraft had replaced the major calibre gun as the dominant naval weapon. Although war games at the Naval War College and demonstrations by Billy Mitchell provided clear indicators, it took the December 1941 disasters of Pearl Harbor and the sinking of the HMS Repulse and Prince of Wales to force the new reality on the admirals. Today, the new reality is that the anti-ship missile is the arbiter of what floats and what does not. This is a condition that has existed since the early 1970s but has not been compellingly revealed due to the lack of an all-out naval battle, just as there was no all-out naval battle between 1922 and 1941 to reveal the bomb’s superiority. Vulnerability can also be generated by concentration. In 1941 the bulk of the U.S. fleet was concentrated at Pearl Harbor, leading Admiral Yamamoto to think that a single knock-out blow was possible. Although today the U.S. Navy is strategically dispersed around the world, its principal combat power is concentrated into eleven aircraft carriers. Taking several of these out would seriously compromise the strategic capabilities of the U.S. Navy, not to mention the potential adverse effects of derailing U.S. policy as happened via the loss of eighteen Special Forces soldiers in Somalia, or conversely stimulating escalation, possibly to the nuclear level. Moreover, a hit on a nuclear carrier that killed hundreds, if not thousands, of U.S. sailors in a single blow might easily generate national outrage and serve to escalate the conflict far above initial intentions. In naval warfare, history has shown that the tactical offense has most often trumped the tactical defence, and thinking that aircraft carriers can be defended against the array of existing and potential anti-ship missiles is not much different than the outlook of battleship admirals in the fall of 1941.15¶ The combination of vulnerability issues suggests that the U.S. Navy and any allied or cooperating navies that seek to constitute a combat credible force in ocean zones threatened by anti-ship missiles will have to disaggregate their power into a dispersed grid of submarines, destroyers and unmanned vehicles, themselves armed with highly lethal anti-ship missiles. Their purpose should be clearly articulated as defending the system by deterring aggression via the sea by means of defeating—at sea—any attempt to do so. Even the best anti-ship missile cannot hit what cannot be found. By disaggregating naval combat power and equipping it to exert sea control—at sea—we thereby eliminate both forms of naval vulnerability that contribute to naval arms races, and the deterioration of deterrence.¶ There is one other vulnerability issue that must be considered, and that is positioning. If caught out of position when a crisis erupts, the reactive movements of naval forces can catalyse rather than deter military action. In 1982, during the crisis leading up to the Falklands War, fears that the British were gathering up naval forces to send south helped put the Argentine Junta in a now-or-never state of mind, which precipitated their invasion and the war.16 If catalysis is to be avoided, naval forces must maintain a persistent presence in such areas where deterrence is necessary. This is why CS21 prescribes concentrated, credible combat forces be stationed forward in East Asia and the Persian Gulf. The Navy’s inventory of ships, aircraft and other systems must be sufficiently large such that this presence can be maintained indefinitely without “using up” ships and sailors at an unsustainable rate.¶ If command of the seas is achieved and maintained wisely by not provoking alarm and not allowing naval vulnerabilities to occur, the seas can constitute a massive geopolitical shock absorber, preventing conflicts in one area of the world from spilling over into others, mainly by keeping hostile armies from moving by sea, and allowing one’s own to do so. Even though this condition holds today as a function of American command of the sea, there has emerged, since the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, the prospect of terrorists and their weapons being smuggled by sea to the shores of America, Europe, China, Japan and other developed countries. Given the disruptive potential of terrorist attacks, it is reasonable to regard them as only a step down from major power war as a threat to the system. Although the attacks of 9/11 were perpetrated by the radical Islamic organization al Qaeda, in the future such strikes might be staged by any number of groups. Although neutralization of such organizations by intelligence or law enforcement agencies is the preferred method, the lack of success to date in doing so for narco-traffickers and other criminal enterprises leaves us to consider at-sea interdiction as a necessary measure.¶ The seas, of course, are huge, and at any moment they are dotted with tens of thousands of ships. There is not now nor has there ever been a navy of sufficient size to hermetically seal off the seas to smugglers. The only way to make the seas a barrier to terrorists is to have every costal nation effectively guard its own waters and establish good teamwork between its navy, intelligence service and law enforcement agencies. Some nations do but many do not. Thus CS21 calls for building capacity in those developing nations whose navies or coast guards are embryonic.¶ The mission of capacity building requires a very different kind of naval force than the one needed to prevent major power war. The main “weapon system” of such a force is the sailors and other personnel that train, educate and influence those in developing countries that will become sailors. The sheer number of countries needing such assistance suggests these missions be conducted from relatively inexpensive ships that can be procured in some numbers. In addition to actual naval forces deployed for capacity building purposes, the navies of developed nations employ their shore training and education infrastructures. The importance of naval academies and war colleges in building not only capacity but relationships cannot be overstated.¶ Beyond capacity building, making the seas a barrier to terrorists requires information about who is at sea, what is in the containers and holds, and where they are. Not only are new forms of surveillance needed, but also intensive information sharing so that two and two can be put together to reveal suspicious activity. To manage this, the U.S. Navy is developing a global network of maritime operations centres that will develop regional pictures that will be shared globally. This, in turn requires an international effort to develop trust and confidence so that information flows freely.¶ If an adequate degree of maritime security can be achieved, the seas will constitute a geopolitical shock absorber in another way. In the wake of 9/11 the United States had no equivalent of the First Lord of the Admiralty, Admiral Lord St Vincent, who supposedly advised a jittery parliament in 1801, “I do not say my lords that the French will not come, I say only that they will not come by sea.” Without the assurance of the seas as a barrier to further attack, it was as if New York City was connected to Kabul and Baghdad by a land bridge. The Bush Administration was spooked by the prospect of a WMD attack and rather stampeded itself into two simultaneous Eurasian land wars that got the United States mired down and over-extended. The comfort of insulating oceans can provide, among other things, a certain poise to the deliberations of the National Security Council and time for cooling off and reflection before committing the nation to war. Moreover, in the wake of the pull-out from Iraq and an increasingly rapid drawdown in Afghanistan, both the current and former U.S. Chiefs of Naval Operations have advanced the notion of an “offshore option” for anchoring forward U.S. military capabilities in the future.17 This would increase the proportionate contribution of naval forces to the U.S. effort to maintain global stability.¶ The threat of terrorism emanates principally from an area of a world that has been variously referred to as the “arc of instability” and Barnett’s Non-Integrating Gap. It encompasses much of Africa and the Middle East as well as parts of Southeast Asia. It is where most failed states exist but also where much of the natural resources necessary for the world economy are found. Thus the nations that constitute the global economic system can ill afford a hands-off strategy of containment, hoping to seal off the area against the spread of terrorism until it heals itself. Therapeutic incisions have been and will continue to be necessary at various times and places.¶ Because of the undeveloped nature of this area of the world, along with the fact that most of its inhabitants live within several hundred miles of the coast, naval force projection capability from a sea base will be necessary. The early phases of the Afghanistan operations were of this nature and we can confidently expect that if and when the world’s developed nations reach a consensus about going into Somalia to cure the piracy problem, it will be a sea-based expeditionary operation. Thus, protection of resource areas will require that some number of navies possess substantial sea-based expeditionary force capability, preferably of a kind that can integrate multi-national contributions easily. Rendering disaster relief, as was done in the tsunami relief effort in 2004, the Haiti earthquake and the Japan tsunami, is also an important form of sea-based force projection that mitigates economic damage to the system. It is likely that future sea-based expeditionary operations will be international, and so that capability must be conceptualized and practiced.¶ The mere presence of naval forces in areas of the world that are the source of resources, notably oil, seems to have a beneficial economic effect. Both routine presence of naval forces and their responses in crises were shown to have a substantial economic benefit in a 1997 study by the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School.18 It found that the initial naval response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is likely to have increased global GDP by over $86 billion.19 Perhaps the least dire threat to the global system is piracy —albeit one that is currently seizing the headlines. Somali pirates, a manifestation of a failed state in the Non-Integrating Gap, hijack merchants and demand ransom for the crew and ship. The actual chance of a particular merchant being hijacked is less than one in nine hundred,20 and shipping companies seem more inclined to pay the ransom than install armed guards aboard their ships. However, the publicity has galvanized nations and their navies to take action. A previous bout of piracy in the Straits of Malacca was cured by the joint action of local navies. The Somalia/Gulf of Aden situation is more problematic since there is no effective governmental authority ashore. However, the emerging world response to it reveals some important facets of an emerging global naval infrastructure that supports the global system of commerce and security.¶ In Mahan’s day, the movement of major naval forces was noted by many countries, sometimes with alarm, as it might presage invasion, or at least a round of coercive diplomacy. In fact, when the PRC announced it was dispatching a small squadron to the Gulf of Aden, there was alarm in some quarters in the United States and other countries that this was a sign of an expansionist China. The Chinese themselves announced that their ships would operate independently in the Gulf of Aden to protect their own merchants. However, after several weeks on station two things happened: the alarm about their movement died off and the Chinese commander suggested a cooperative zone defence in order to make most efficient use of the international naval forces on station. Moreover, not only the Chinese are there, but the Russians, NATO, EU (different task force), the Japanese, Koreans, Singaporeans and even the “rogue” nation of Iran. Everybody is cooperating—why, how and what does it mean?¶ To start with, we must acknowledge the uniqueness of the Gulf of Aden situation. Somalia is a failed state that possesses neither resources nor location that would incite major power rivalry over influence ashore there. There is a universal confluence of interests centred on the protection of shipping. The unusual absence of major power competition allows naval operations to follow their natural course and provide a unique opportunity for us to see the security side of the global system in action.¶ The Chinese, Russians, Iranians and other naval forces have become virtually invisible in the Gulf of Aden because they have fallen in on an existing framework and infrastructure of sea power that girdles the globe. This infrastructure (perhaps more accurately the maritime security subsystem of the global economic system) consists of both physical and intangible elements. On the physical side, there is the U.S. Navy’s world-wide logistics system. It operates 24/7/365 and is composed of a web of bases, husbanding (victuals) contracts and replenishment ships, augmented by the supply ships of the Royal Navy, Japan and other allies. This system can support international naval operations anywhere in the world. In addition, there are GPS and communication satellites as well as the ubiquitous internet. Among the intangibles are the UN Law of the Sea that provides a clear framework for who can do what in whose waters, any number of other international agreements governing a range of maritime issues, and a world conditioned to see U.S. Navy and allied ships cruising the littorals of Eurasia. Perhaps another intangible element is CS21 itself, which casts the United States and its navy in a defensive posture (defence of the global system). This makes it easier politically for other nations to deploy their ships on a cooperative mission and make use of the U.S. Navy’s logistics system. It also appears that the navies of the world are getting comfortable with looser coordination arrangements. Before the internet, strict communications, protocols, and structured command and control schemes were necessary. With the internet, everyone can talk more extensively and in new ways such that restrictive command arrangements are not so necessary. This in turn obviates the need for formal agreements prior to conducting cooperative operations. With the political and technical barriers to entry low, nations become more willing to send their navies on cooperative ventures.¶ Previously we discussed the seas as geopolitical shock absorbers, both to limit other nations’ options for aggression and to provide our own government time for reflection and preserving the option of doing nothing. In the cooperative naval operations off Somalia, we see another aspect of the phenomenon emerging in a very positive way. It turns out that ships from the Chinese, Japanese and South Korean navies have taken to operating together in the Gulf of Aden. Strange bedfellows indeed, but as both the Japanese navy’s operations chief and a Chinese maritime scholar have said to the author on different occasions, cooperating on easier missions can build trust and confidence that will provide a basis for achieving resolution of more difficult maritime issues between the nations. This is indeed geopolitical shock absorbing of the most congenial kind.¶ We have now arrived at a point where we can put all of the elements of modern naval endeavour together in a new syllogism. Navies protect their nations’ economic prospects by operating cooperatively to defend all elements of the global system of commerce and security. Their necessary functions range from averting naval arms races to rendering disaster relief to, yes, protecting shipping. But it is not an every navy for itself process; the more cooperation, the better. It may even turn out that sustained and habitual international naval cooperation will someday make the concept of command of the sea irrelevant. Until then, the U.S. Navy must exert careful stewardship over its command of the sea, keep its global logistics system robust and develop the capacity to catalyse a global maritime security partnership on a broad front by being in a lot of places at the same time. Other navies must also look at the world in systems terms if they are to most effectively develop utility arguments and determine how to most effectively target their limited resources.¶ If one accepts the arguments that underpin the new syllogism of how navies support economic prosperity, then reasons for optimism become clear. Naval building programmes in China, India and elsewhere do not have to lead to war as has happened in the past in Europe; there is a reasonable prospect that the seas can be denied to terrorists; the seas can be used to bring the Non-Integrating Gap into the system; and the emerging pattern of naval cooperating can not only secure the seas but reduce the likelihood of conflict and war.¶ None of this will happen if nations let their navies decay. The unique thing about navies is that their optimum utility is in time of peace. When sea power is hitting on all cylinders, it is invisible. An investment in sea power is most appropriate and effective at a point when threats are not apparent. In Mahan’s day the syllogism of sea power focused on the sovereign interests of individual nations and its application led eventually to war.¶ Today we see the world as a system, with a sea power logic that is expressed in systems terms. Its application, that is, investment in navies structured along systemic lines, promises a massive return in the form of an extended and improving peace and—despite the current global economic woes—prosperity.

#### Ineffective crisis response guarantees extinction --- a laundry list of threats are on the brink

Paul Miller 11, Assistant Professor of International Security Studies at the National Defense University, former director for Afghanistan on the National Security Council, October 17, 2011, “This is no time to cut defense,” online: http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/10/17/this\_is\_no\_time\_to\_cut\_defense

The threats to us are more numerous, not less. There are two major families of threats to U.S. national security today. First, at one end of the state spectrum, are the nuclear-armed authoritarian powers: Russia, China, soon Iran, North Korea as a junior partner, and Pakistan if it falls to jihadists. The latter three are (or will be) new to the nuclear club since the Cold War, and China is vastly more powerful today than it was in 1989. Second, at the other end, is the aggregate global consequences of state failure and anarchy across much of the world -- such as the rise of terrorist groups, organized crime, drug cartels, human traffickers, nuclear smugglers, pandemic disease, and piracy -- that will collectively erode global stability and raise the cost of U.S. leadership. State failure, with its effects magnified by globalization, is also a vastly greater threat that during the Cold War. These two families are the threats we face in the 21st Century. By contrast, we faced fewer threats and a simpler world at almost every point in our history before 1989.¶ The threats are equally apocalyptic. Nuclear war with the Soviet Union was the gravest danger we ever faced, and we came perilously close to it in 1962. Nuclear war with Iran or North Korea would be almost equally dangerous, especially after they have acquired longer-range ballistic missiles capable of hitting U.S. allies and even the U.S. homeland. (Yes, the Soviet Union had thousands of warheads, but you only need a few nukes to cause more damage to us than all the wars we have fought in history, combined, and only a few dozen to effectively wipe out the United States. And if I were a new nuclear power, I wouldn't announce my capability until I already had a few dozen to make sure I could withstand an attack on my arsenal. Which means that North Korea and Iran (when it announces) will almost certainly be existential threats). The difference is that war with them or their proxies may be more likely to actually happen. The latter two countries may be less deterrable, less predictable, and more prone to transfer nuclear technology to proxies and non-state groups, given their history of erratic behavior, sponsoring terrorism, and proliferation. All told, the chances of a nuclear detonation in New York City are higher, not lower, today than twenty years ago. Unfortunately, we do not have a team of patriotic mutant superheroes to avert disaster this time.¶ Our allies are less capable, not more. Militarily, the Allies have underinvested in defense for decades-nothing new there. But the situation is actually getting worse, not better. The European allies spent 1.7 percent of GDP on defense in 2010 compared to 3.7 percent in 1985, according to NATO figures, a huge decline. As a result, the allies' performance in Libya and Afghanistan has not covered them with glory. And the alliance -- including us -- is still using mostly the same weapons systems and platforms that were developed in the late Cold War, just with a layer of IT, often glitchy and unreliable, grafted on in recent years (I agree with Tom's new post in this respect). Politically, the alliance has suffered tremendous strain from the double hammer-blows of disagreement over Iraq followed by unequal burden-sharing and nearly losing the war in Afghanistan. I am less confident in the alliance now than during the Cold War.¶ Our enemies and competitors are more capable, not less. Again, several states have acquired nuclear weapons since 1989. China has engaged in a massive conventional military buildup. Russia, after initially suffering a crippling loss of manpower, resources, and morale, has undertaken a long process of professionalizing and modernizing its military. Non-state actors have harnessed the tools of globalization and exploited the weakness of failed states to give them a global operating scope and comfortable safe haven.¶ Our values are not ascendant. The global financial crisis has (unfairly, I think) cast disrepute on the west in the eyes of many developing nations. China's rise has made state-managed and autocratic development attractive to many an aspiring power. Illiberal political Islam, with its hostility to women's rights and religious freedom, is at least competing aggressively with democracy and human rights across the Islamic world. Hindutva, largely content to compete peacefully through the Indian democratic system so far, may not always be so. Marxism of a sort is still alive, fashionable, and even resurgent in a few quarters like Venezuela and Bolivia. Democracy has indeed spread farther since 1989 than ever before in human history, but that is different from "ascendancy." Democratic gains since 1989, for example in Africa and Latin America, are new and might easily be reversed, especially given the competition.¶ What worries me is that I am increasingly convinced that we do not have the capabilities to meet the various threats we face today. We don't need to be omnipotent, but we do need to be able to protect ourselves. Can we stave off state failure in Pakistan? Can we prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, or contain it afterwards? Could we prevent Russia from doing to Ukraine what it did to Georgia in 2008? Can we defeat the drug cartels wreaking havoc in Mexico and Columbia? Is al-Qaida really nearing "strategic defeat," as Panetta claims? Are we prepared to handle a collapse in North Korea -- possibly having to fight a sudden war with a desperate regime, contribute to a multilateral occupation and reconstruction afterwards, and handle the delicate diplomacy with the Chinese?

#### The plan’s immediate, unilateral action would cause a transition war – declining powers lead to opportunistic behavior by rising powers

Mearsheimer 14 (John J. Mearsheimer is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, “Can China Rise Peacefully?”, April 07, 2014 published, National Interest posted on October 25, 2014, Accessed 7/27/16, Available online at <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204?page=20>, JRR)

Once a state achieves regional hegemony, it has a further aim: to prevent other great powers from dominating their geographical regions. In other words, no regional hegemon wants a peer competitor. The main reason is that regional hegemons—because they are so dominant in their neighborhood—are free to roam around the globe and interfere in other regions of the world. This situation implies that regional hegemons are likely to try to cause trouble in each other’s backyard. Thus, any state that achieves regional hegemony will want to make sure that no other great power achieves a similar position, freeing that counterpart to roam into its neighborhood. Most Americans never think about it, but one of the main reasons the United States is able to station military forces all around the globe and intrude in the politics of virtually every region is that it faces no serious threats in the Western Hemisphere. If the United States had dangerous foes in its own backyard, it would be much less capable of roaming into distant regions. But if a rival state achieves regional dominance, the goal will be to end its hegemony as expeditiously as possible. The reason is simple: it is much more propitious to have two or more great powers in all the other key areas of the world, so that the great powers there will have to worry about each other and thus be less able to interfere in the distant hegemon’s own backyard. In sum, the best way to survive in international anarchy is to be the sole regional hegemon.

#### Lack of redlines makes US-China the most probable scenario for nuclear war

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Neither the U.S. nor China has any interest in any kind of war with one other, nuclear or non-nuclear. The greater risk is an accident. Here's how it would happen. First, an unforeseen event that sparks a small conflict or threat of conflict. Second, a rapid escalation that moves too fast for either side to defuse. And, third, a mutual misunderstanding of one another's intentions. This three-part process can move so quickly that the best way to avert a nuclear war is for both sides to have absoThlute confidence that they understand when the other will and will not use a nuclear weapon. Without this, U.S. and Chinese policy-makers would have to guess -- perhaps with only a few minutes -- if and when the other side would go nuclear. This is especially scary because both sides have good reason to err on the side of assuming nuclear war. If you think there's a 50-50 chance that someone is about to lob a nuclear bomb at you, your incentive is to launch a preventative strike, just to be safe. This is especially true because you know the other side is thinking the exact same thing. In fact, even if you think the other side probably won't launch an ICBM your way, they actually might if they fear that you're misreading their intentions or if they fear that you might over-react; this means they have a greater incentive to launch a preemptive strike, which means that you have a greater incentive to launch a preemptive strike, in turn raising their incentives, and on and on until one tiny kernel of doubt can lead to a full-fledged war that nobody wants. The U.S. and the Soviet Union faced similar problems, with one important difference: speed. During the first decades of the Cold War, nuclear bombs had to be delivered by sluggish bombers that could take hours to reach their targets and be recalled at any time. Escalation was much slower and the risks of it spiraling out of control were much lower. By the time that both countries developed the ICBMs that made global annihilation something that could happen within a matter of minutes, they'd also had a generation to sort out an extremely clear understanding of one another's nuclear policies. But the U.S. and China have no such luxury -- we inherited a world where total mutual destruction can happen as quickly as the time it takes to turn a key and push a button. The U.S. has the world's second-largest nuclear arsenal with around 5,000 warheads (first-ranked Russia has more warheads but less capability for flinging them around the globe); China has only about 200, so the danger of accidental war would seem to disproportionately threaten China. But the greatest risk is probably to the states on China's periphery. The borders of East Asia are still not entirely settled; there are a number of small, disputed territories, many of them bordering China. But the biggest potential conflict points are on water: disputed naval borders, disputed islands, disputed shipping lanes, and disputed underwater energy reserves. These regional disputes have already led to a handful of small-scale naval skirmishes and diplomatic stand-offs. It's not difficult to foresee one of them spiraling out of control. But what if the country squaring off with China happens to have a defense treaty with the U.S.? There's a near-infinite number of small-scale conflicts that could come up between the U.S. and China, and though none of them should escalate any higher than a few tough words between diplomats, it's the unpredictable events that are the most dangerous. In 1983 alone, the U.S. and Soviet Union almost went to war twice over bizarre and unforeseeable events. In September, the Soviet Union shot down a Korean airliner it mistook for a spy plane; first Soviet officials feared the U.S. had manufactured the incident as an excuse to start a war, then they refused to admit their error, nearly pushing the U.S. to actually start war. Two months later, Soviet spies misread an elaborate U.S. wargame (which the U.S. had unwisely kept secret) as preparations for an unannounced nuclear hit on Moscow, nearly leading them to launch a preemptive strike. In both cases, one of the things that ultimately diverted disaster was the fact that both sides clearly understood the others' red lines -- as long as they didn't cross them, they could remain confident there would be no nuclear war But the U.S. and China have not yet clarified their red lines for nuclear strikes. The kinds of bizarre, freak accidents that the U.S. and Soviet Union barely survived in 1983 might well bring today's two Pacific powers into conflict -- unless, of course, they can clarify their rules. Of the many ways that the U.S. and China could stumble into the nightmare scenario that neither wants, here are five of the most likely. Any one of these appears to be extremely unlikely in today's world. But that -- like the Soviet mishaps of the 1980s -- is exactly what makes them so dangerous. (1) China or the Philippines seize a disputed island. Many of these islands are resource rich, important to controlling the South China Sea (one of the world's most important shipping lanes), or both. It's also not clear who owns which. The U.S. has worked hard to create dispute-resolution mechanisms so that the Pacific rim nations can peacefully resolve conflicts over disputed islands. But it's always possible that confusion, greed, or domestic politics could drive one of these three countries to act rashly. There's an off chance that could lead to a naval skirmish, then maybe even a troop deployment. China, which has one of the world's largest militaries, might be tempted to use overwhelming force to quickly and decisively end such a dispute. This might lead the Philippines to act disproportionately aggressive. If the two countries escalate rapidly and unpredictably, the Philippines could remind the U.S. about their mutual defense treaty. And that's how the threat of a Sino-Filipino war could become the threat of a Sino-American war. Photo: Philippine marines watch as U.S. Marines storm a beach with Philippine counterpart during a joint military exercise. China-watchers may have noticed something missing from this list: a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. It's possible though unlikely this could happen, and just as possible (though even less likely) that it could happen and it could escalate to the point of drawing in U.S. involvement. But this probably poses the least risk of escalating into nuclear conflict precisely because the U.S. and China have spent so much time discussing it and have achieved such mutual clarity on the matter. The U.S. knows exactly where China and Taiwan stands; China knows exactly where Taiwan and the U.S. stand. Even if a Chinese invasion ever does happen, there's enough mutual understanding that both sides will have a good idea how to avoid unwanted escalation. And that's exactly what the U.S. and China need more of if they want to prevent nuclear war: clarity, understanding, and if not trust in each other, then at least trust in each other's incentives and intentions. In the coming decades, one of the above five incidents may very well happen. Where it leads will depend a great deal on what kind of groundwork the U.S. and China can lay now.

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#### The aff’s anti-hegemony rhetoric is unethical and threatens the moral force of hegemony

**Kagan** **98**

(Robert, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and PhD in American History from American University, “The Benevolent Empire,” Foreign Policy. Summer, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=275 AFM)

**Those contributing to the growing chorus of antihegemony** and multipolarity may **know they are playing a dangerous game**, one **that needs to be conducted with the utmost care**, as French leaders did during the Cold War**, lest the entire international system come crashing down around them.** What **they may not have adequately calculated**, however, is the possibility **that Americans will not respond** as wisely as they generally did during the Cold War. **Americans and their leaders should not take all this sophisticated whining about U.S. hegemony too seriously**. They certainly should not take it more seriously than the whiners themselves do. But, of course, Americans are taking it seriously. **In the United States these days, the lugubrious guilt trip of post-Vietnam liberalism is echoed even by conservatives, with William Buckley, Samuel Huntington, and James Schlesinger all decrying American "hubris," "arrogance," and "imperialism."** Clinton administration officials, in between speeches exalting America as the "indispensable" nation, increasingly behave as if what is truly indispensable is the prior approval of China, France, and Russia for every military action. Moreover, at another level, **there is a stirring of neo-isolationism in America today,** a mood that nicely complements the view among many Europeans that America is meddling too much in everyone else's business and taking too little time to mind its own. The existence of the Soviet Union disciplined Americans and made them see that their enlightened self-interest lay in a relatively generous foreign policy. Today, that discipline is no longer present. ¶ In other words, **foreign grumbling about American hegemony would be merely amusing, were it not for the very real possibility that too many Americans will forget —** even if most of the rest of the world does not — **just how important continued American dominance is to the preservation of a reasonable level of international security and prosperity**. World leaders may want to keep this in mind when they pop the champagne corks in celebration of the next American humbling.

#### Global violence is inevitable because states inevitably seek status – only hegemony can deter conflicts

Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth ’13 (Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7–51)

A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world’s core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client states—all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferationchanges as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces—seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics” that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. The problem is that China’s rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, “The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.” 81 Therefore, unless China’s rise stalls, “the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” 82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia— just what the United States is doing. 83 In sum, the argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary **for peace** is countered by a lot of scholarship, including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difªcult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competition in the world’s key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States’ formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the “focused enmity” of the United States. 84 All of the world’s most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America’s alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking. 85

**Heg decreases structural violence**

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First the absurdity: A few of the most over-the-top Bush-Cheney neocons did indeed promote a vision of U.S. primacy by which America shouldn't be afraid to wage war to keep other rising powers at bay. It was a nutty concept then, and it remains a nutty concept today. But since it feeds a lot of major military weapons system purchases, especially for the China-centric Air Force and Navy, don't expect it to disappear so long as the Pentagon's internal budget fights are growing in intensity. ¶ Meanwhile, the Chinese do their stupid best to fuel this outdated logic by building a force designed to keep America out of East Asia just as their nation's dependency on resources flowing from unstable developing regions skyrockets. With America's fiscal constraints now abundantly clear, the world's primary policing force is pulling back, while that force's implied successor is nowhere close to being able to field a similar power-projection capacity -- and never will be. So with NATO clearly stretched to its limits by the combination of Afghanistan and Libya, a lot of future fires in developing regions will likely be left to burn on their own. We'll just have to wait and see how much foreign commentators delight in that G-Zero dynamic in the years ahead. ¶ That gets us to the original "insult": the U.S. did not lord it over the world in the 1990s. Yes, it did argue for and promote the most rapid spread of globalization possible. But the "evil" of the Washington Consensus only yielded the most rapid growth of a truly global middle class that the world has ever seen. Yes, we can, in our current economic funk, somehow cast that development as the "loss of U.S. hegemony," in that the American consumer is no longer the demand-center of globalization's universe. But this is without a doubt the most amazing achievement of U.S. foreign policy, surpassing even our role in World War II. ¶ Numerous world powers served as global or regional hegemons before we came along, and their record on economic development was painfully transparent: Elites got richer, and the masses got poorer. Then America showed up after World War II and engineered an international liberal trade order, one that was at first admittedly limited to the West. But within four decades it went virally global, and now for the first time in history, more than half of our planet's population lives in conditions of modest-to-mounting abundance -- after millennia of mere sustenance. ¶ You may choose to interpret this as some sort of cosmic coincidence, but the historical sequence is undeniable: With its unrivaled power, America made the world a far better place. ¶ That spreading wave of global abundance has reformatted all sorts of traditional societies that lay in its path. Some, like the Chinese, have adapted to it magnificently in an economic and social sense, with the political adaptation sure to follow eventually. Others, being already democracies, have done far better across the board, like Turkey, Indonesia and India. But there are also numerous traditional societies where that reformatting impulse from below has been met by both harsh repression from above and violent attempts by religious extremists to effect a "counterreformation" that firewalls the "faithful" from an "evil" outside world.¶ Does this violent blowback constitute the great threat of our age? Not really. As I've long argued, this "friction" from globalization's tectonic advance is merely what's left over now that great-power war has gone dormant for 66 years and counting, with interstate wars now so infrequent and so less lethal as to be dwarfed by the civil strife that plagues those developing regions still suffering weak connectivity to the global economy. ¶ Let's remember what the U.S. actually did across the 1990s after the Soviet threat disappeared. It went out of its way to police the world's poorly governed spaces, battling rogue regimes and answering the 9-1-1 call repeatedly when disaster and/or civil strife struck vulnerable societies. Yes, playing globalization's bodyguard made America public enemy No. 1 in the eyes of its most violent rejectionist movements, including al-Qaida, but we made the effort because, in our heart of hearts, we knew that this is what blessed powers are supposed to do. ¶ Some, like the Bush-Cheney neocons, were driven by more than that sense of moral responsibility. They saw a chance to remake the world so as to assure U.S. primacy deep into the future. The timing of their dream was cruelly ironic, for it blossomed just as America's decades-in-the-making grand strategy reached its apogee in the peaceful rise of so many great powers at once. Had Sept. 11 not intervened, the neocons would likely have eventually targeted rising China for strategic demonization. Instead, they locked in on Osama bin Laden. The rest, as they say, is history. ¶ The follow-on irony of the War on Terror is that its operational requirements actually revolutionized a major portion of the U.S. military -- specifically the Army, Marines and Special Forces -- in such a way as to redirect their strategic ethos from big wars to small ones. It also forged a new operational bond between the military's irregular elements and that portion of the Central Intelligence Agency that pursues direct action against transnational bad actors. The up-front costs of this transformation were far too high, largely because the Bush White House stubbornly refused to embrace counterinsurgency tactics until after the popular repudiation signaled by the 2006 midterm election. But the end result is clear: We now have the force we actually need to manage this global era.¶ But, of course, that can all be tossed into the dumpster if we convince ourselves that our "loss" of hegemony was somehow the result of our own misdeed, instead of being our most profound gift to world history. Again, we grabbed the reins of global leadership and patiently engineered not only the greatest redistribution -- and expansion -- of global wealth ever seen, but also the greatest consolidation of global peace ever seen. ¶ Now, if we can sensibly realign our strategic relationship with the one rising great power, China, whose growing strength upsets us so much, then in combination with the rest of the world's rising great powers we can collectively wield enough global policing power to manage what's yet to come. ¶ As always, the choice is ours.

### AFF FW

### A2 Threat Con [Pieterse]

#### Threats real – threat inflation would get our authors fired

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The underlying notion of “the security bureaucracies . . . looking for new enemies” is a threadbare concept that has somehow taken hold across the political spectrum, from the radical left (viz. Michael Klare [1981], who refers to a “threat bank”), to the liberal center (viz. Robert H. Johnson [1997], who dismisses most alleged “threats” as “improbable dangers”), to libertarians (viz. Ted Galen Carpenter [1992], Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy of the Cato Institute, who wrote a book entitled A Search for Enemies). What is missing from most analysts’ claims of “threat inflation,” however, is a convincing theory of why, say, the American government significantly(not merely in excusable rhetoric) might magnify and even invent threats (and, more seriously, act on such inflated threat estimates). In a few places, Eland (2004, 185) suggests that such behavior might stem from military or national security bureaucrats’ attempts to enhance their personal status and organizational budgets, or even from the influence and dominance of “the military-industrial complex”; viz.: “Maintaining the empire and retaliating for the blowback from that empire keeps what President Eisenhower called the military-industrial complex fat and happy.” Or, in the same section:¶ In the nation’s capital, vested interests, such as the law enforcement bureaucracies . . . routinely take advantage of “crises”to satisfy parochial desires. Similarly, many corporations use crises to get pet projects— a.k.a. pork—funded by the government. And national security crises, because of people’s fears, are especially ripe opportunities to grab largesse. (Ibid., 182)¶ Thus, “bureaucratic-politics” theory, which once made several reputa- tions (such as those of Richard Neustadt, Morton Halperin, and Graham Allison) in defense-intellectual circles, and spawned an entire sub-industry within the field of international relations,5 is put into the service of dismissing putative security threats as imaginary. So, too, can a surprisingly cognate theory, “public choice,”6 which can be considered the right-wing analog of the “bureaucratic-politics” model, and is a preferred interpretation of governmental decision- making among libertarian observers. As Eland (2004, 203) summarizes:¶ Public-choice theory argues [that] the government itself can develop sepa- rate interests from its citizens. The government reflects the interests of powerful pressure groups and the interests of the bureaucracies and the bureaucrats in them. Although this problem occurs in both foreign and domestic policy, it may be more severe in foreign policy because citizens pay less attention to policies that affect them less directly.¶ There is, in this statement of public-choice theory, a certain ambiguity, and a certain degree of contradiction: Bureaucrats are supposedly, at the same time, subservient to societal interest groups and autonomous from society in general.¶ This journal has pioneered the argument that state autonomy is a likely consequence of the public’s ignorance of most areas of state activity (e.g., Somin 1998; DeCanio 2000a, 2000b, 2006, 2007; Ravenal 2000a). But state autonomy does not necessarily mean that bureaucrats substitute their own interests for those of what could be called the “national society” that they ostensibly serve. I have argued (Ravenal 2000a) that, precisely because of the public-ignorance and elite-expertise factors, and especially because the opportunities—at least for bureaucrats (a few notable post-government lobbyist cases nonwithstanding)—for lucrative self-dealing are stringently fewer in the defense and diplomatic areas of government than they are in some of the contract-dispensing and more under-the-radar-screen agencies of government, the “public-choice” imputation of self-dealing, rather than working toward the national interest (which, however may not be synonymous with the interests, perceived or expressed, of citizens!) is less likely to hold. In short, state autonomy is likely to mean, in the derivation of foreign policy, that “state elites” are using rational judgment, in insulation from self-promoting interest groups—about what strategies, forces, and weapons are required for national defense.¶ Ironically, “public choice”—not even a species of economics, but rather a kind of political interpretation—is not even about “public” choice, since, like the bureaucratic-politics model, it repudiates the very notion that bureaucrats make truly “public” choices; rather, they are held, axiomatically, to exhibit “rent-seeking” behavior, wherein they abuse their public positions in order to amass private gains, or at least to build personal empires within their ostensibly official niches. Such sub- rational models actually explain very little of what they purport to observe. Of course, there is some truth in them, regarding the “behavior” of some people, at some times, in some circumstances, under some conditions of incentive and motivation. But the factors that they posit operate mostly as constraints on the otherwise rational optimization of objectives that, if for no other reason than the playing out of official roles, transcends merely personal or parochial imperatives.¶ My treatment of “role” differs from that of the bureaucratic-politics theorists, whose model of the derivation of foreign policy depends heavily, and acknowledgedly, on a narrow and specific identification of the role- playing of organizationally situated individuals in a partly conflictual “pulling and hauling” process that “results in” some policy outcome. Even here, bureaucratic-politics theorists Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow (1999, 311) allow that “some players are not able to articulate [sic] the governmental politics game because their conception of their job does not legitimate such activity.” This is a crucial admission, and one that points— empirically—to the need for a broader and generic treatment of role.¶ Roles (all theorists state) give rise to “expectations” of performance. My point is that virtually every governmental role, and especially national-security roles, and particularly the roles of the uniformed military, embody expectations of devotion to the “national interest”; rationality in the derivation of policy at every functional level; and objectivity in the treatment of parameters, especially external parameters such as “threats” and the power and capabilities of other nations. Sub-rational models (such as “public choice”) fail to take into account even a partial dedication to the “national” interest (or even the possibility that the national interest may be honestly misconceived in more parochial terms). In contrast, an official’s role connects the individual to the (state-level) process, and moderates the (perhaps otherwise) self-seeking impulses of the individual. Role-derived behavior tends to be formalized and codified; relatively transparent and at least peer-reviewed, so as to be consistent with expectations; surviving the particular individual and trans- mitted to successors and ancillaries; measured against a standard and thus corrigible; defined in terms of the performed function and therefore derived from the state function; and uncorrrupt, because personal cheating and even egregious aggrandizement are conspicuously discouraged.¶ My own direct observation suggests that defense decision-makers attempt to “frame” the structure of the problems that they try to solve on the basis of the most accurate intelligence. They make it their business to know where the threats come from. Thus, threats are not “socially constructed” (even though, of course, some values are). A major reason for the rationality, and the objectivity, of the process is that much security planning is done, not in vaguely undefined circumstances that offer scope for idiosyncratic, subjective behavior, but rather in structured and reviewed organizational frameworks. Non-rationalities (which are bad for understanding and prediction) tend to get filtered out. People are fired for presenting skewed analysis and for making bad predictions. This is because something important is riding on the causal analysis and the contingent prediction. For these reasons, “public choice” does not have the “feel” of reality to many critics who have participated in the structure of defense decision-making. In that structure, obvious, and even not-so-obvious,“rent-seeking” would not only be shameful; it would present a severe risk of career termination. And, as mentioned, the defense bureaucracy is hardly a productive place for truly talented rent-seekers to operatecompared to opportunities for personal profit in the commercial world. A bureaucrat’s very self-placement in these reaches of government testi- fies either to a sincere commitment to the national interest or to a lack of sufficient imagination to exploit opportunities for personal profit.

#### Their Pieterse evidence is woefully unwarranted.

#### Constructing threats makes the military look inept since they’re not doing their job – ISIS’ expansion caused criticism of military strategy, not praise

#### They say experts like it’s a bad thing – they have more info and should be trusted

#### [extra] Our advantage isn’t based on myopic security discourse- multiple independent fields support heg – interdisciplinary research is more likely to be true

Wohlforth 9 William, professor of government at Dartmouth College, “ Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War”Project Muse

Mainstream theories generally posit that states come to blows over an international status quo only when it has implications for their security or material well-being. The guiding assumption is that a state’s satisfaction [End Page 34] with its place in the existing order is a function of the material costs and benefits implied by that status.24 By that assumption, once a state’s status in an international order ceases to affect its material wellbeing, its relative standing will have no bearing on decisions for war or peace. But the assumption is undermined by cumulative research in disciplines ranging from neuroscience and evolutionary biology to economics, anthropology, sociology, and psychology that human beings are powerfully motivated by the desire for favorable social status comparisons. This research suggests that the preference for status is a basic disposition rather than merely a strategy for attaining other goals.25 People often seek tangibles not so much because of the welfare or security they bring but because of the social status they confer. Under certain conditions, the search for status will cause people to behave in ways that directly contradict their material interest in security and/or prosperity.

### A2 Death Spiral [CACC]

#### 1. This card is laughable – main cause of emissions is cars, not militarism, and they have no warrant why militaries contribute to emissions – too many alt causes to solve warming

WYI 14 [(What'S Your Impact, registered non-profit organization) Greenhouse Gas Emissions - Main Sources What's Your Impact Last date cited 2014] AT

There are 2 ways that greenhouse gas emissions enters our atmosphere. One of them is through human activities. The main human sources of greenhouse gas emissions are: fossil fuel use, deforestation, intensive livestock farming, use of synthetic fertilizers and industrial processes. The other is through natural processes like animal and plant respiration.

#### 2. No link between healthcare and militarism – downsizing carriers wouldn’t cause Congress to change the vote on healthcare, and there’s no warrant why healthcare *spending* is good

#### 3. US heg is key to burden sharing that reduces global military expenditures – turns their healthcare warrant since poorer countries need to conserve military spending more than we do

#### 4. They didn’t read a warming impact so don’t give it to them – humans have terraformed every region they live in and would adapt to warming

### A2 Comes Home to Roost

#### Ending carriers doesn’t solve – gun culture, general hatred, and white supremacy are alt causes

Colin Jenkins, “Coming Home to Roost: American Militarism, War Culture, and Police Brutality”. February 27th, 2014. Society and Culture. The Hampton Institute. Colin Jenkins is founder, editor and Social Economics Department chair at the Hampton Institute, and has been published at Truthout, Common Dreams, Dissident Voice, Black Agenda Report, Popular Resistance, Z Magazine, and New Politics.

America's culture of war and violence was bound to catch up to all of us. Over the past decade, yearly US military expenditures more than doubled from a little over $300 billion in 2001 to over $682 billion in 2013. [61] [62] US military spending represents 39% of global spending - more than the combined spending of China, Russia, United Kingdom, Japan, France, Saudi Arabia, Germany, India, Italy, Canada, and Australia. Since 1945, the US military has invaded, intervened in, or occupied at least 50 countries.[63] Currently, the US operates and/or controls between 700 and 800 military bases worldwide, a list that includes locations in 63 countries. In addition to these bases, there are 255, 065 US military personnel deployed in 156 countries worldwide.[64] This global military presence has real and often disastrous consequences for human life. In the 2011 book, The Deaths of Others: The Fate of Civilians in America's Wars, author John Tirman estimates that "between six and seven million people died in Korea, Vietnam and Iraq alone, the majority of them civilians."[65] However, wartime casualties pale in comparison to the lingering effects, chaos, and disorder stemming from prolonged military occupations. "In the period 1950-2005, there have been 82 million avoidable deaths from deprivation (avoidable mortality, excess deaths, excess mortality , deaths that did not have to happen) associated with countries occupied by the US in the post-1945 era."[66] While it's difficult to gauge how much of a role the military occupations played in this devastation, it's safe to assume the instability created by such occupations factor significantly. The violence that is perpetrated abroad mimics the violent culture at home. As of June 2013, it's estimated that there are up to 310 million guns in the US, which amounts to just about one gun per person (the US population is 314 million).[67] The next highest number of guns per capita by country is Serbia at 58% and Yemen at 55%, compared to the US at 90%.[68] Since 1968, there have been 1,384,171 gunfire deaths in the US - which amounts to more American deaths than from all **of the** US wars **in the nation's history** combined (1,171,177).[69] The US averages 10.2 "firearm-related deaths" per every 100,000 people. Americans are 10 times more likely to suffer gun-related deaths than people in Australia and Ireland; 15 times more likely than people in Turkey; 40 times more likely than those in England; and 170 times more likely than those in Japan. [70] America's police forces also reflect this culture. And while law enforcement agencies across the US have delivered pain and devastation to poorer, inner-city communities for nearly a half-century, their militarization has only recently begun to attract national attention. Much of this attention can be pinpointed to the Occupy Wall Street movement and the response it received from police, which included unadulterated brutality against peaceful protesters, unnecessary use of force, and the negligent use of tasers and Oleoresin Capsicum (pepper) spray - a substance that has been proven to cause "adverse cardiac, respiratory, and neurologic effects, including arrhythmias and even sudden death" in some cases.[71] However, it was not merely these careless and sadistic actions which have attracted such attention, but rather the changing profile of the victims of this brutality - young, white, "middle-class" women and men. "For 25 years, the primary 'beneficiaries' of police militarization have been poor people in high-crime areas - people who generally haven't had the power or platform to speak up," explains Balko. "The Occupy protesters were largely affluent, white, and deft at using cell phones and social media to document and publicize incidents of excessive force." Their public victimization, despite falling far short of the police brutality that has existed within communities of color for decades, inevitably struck a chord with a nation still inundated with white supremacist ideals that assign varying degrees of value to American lives - mainly based on the color of one's skin and their socioeconomic background. Ultimately, white members of the media, seeing reflections of their own sons and daughters being abused, suddenly chose to report en masse. White viewers, seeing reflections of their neighbors and relatives, suddenly expressed widespread disgust. This was no longer an episode of COPS, "glamorizing controversial police tactics" and perpetuating "implicit biases regarding race and class." [72] These were now white, middle-class lives being affected and brutalized. Essentially, the hate that Malcolm X spoke of, historically reserved for "defenseless black people," is now developing into indiscriminate rage - targeting poor and working-class people of all colors throughout the US. Through this ongoing process, it is becoming apparent that even white privilege, in itself, is beginning to lose its immunity from this unaccountable wrath. The 2011 beating of a homeless schizophrenic man, Kelly Thomas, in a transit parking lot in Fullerton, California confirmed this wrath. The incident was, unbeknown to officers, recorded by security cameras on the night of July 5, 2011, and later viewed by millions of Americans as the officers' trial was closely followed. Thomas was unarmed and posed no threat at the time of the beating. "The surveillance camera footage shows Thomas being beaten, clubbed and stunned with a Taser by police." [73] Thomas suffered a coma and died five days later in a hospital bed. November of 2011 showcased yet another incident of blatant disregard as a police officer doused UC-Davis students with streams of pepper spray. At the time, the students were engaged in non-violent protest by sitting together with their arms locked. Video footage of the officer calmly and methodically walking up and down the line of students, spraying in and around their faces without pause, epitomized the sadistic nature of modern policing. [74] On August 10, 2013, Tallahassee police officers, while conducting a field sobriety test on 44-year-old Christina West, forcefully slammed her face-first into the road as one officer screamed in rage. While obviously inebriated, Ms. West was subjected to what City Commissioner Scott Maddox later described as "a disturbing use of force against a completely non-aggressive arrestee."[75] In September of 2013, 20-year-old David Connor Castellani was arrested, beaten by police, and attacked by a K-9 unit after a verbal altercation outside of an Atlantic City casino. Castellani was unarmed.[76] The following month, after a disagreement with his father over cigarettes, 19-year-old Tyler Comstock found himself the target of a police chase in Iowa. Despite being told to "back off" in order to defuse the situation, officers escalated the incident by pursuing Comstock, crashing into the truck he was driving, and shooting and killing him. He was unarmed. [77] In January of 2014, a 2009 surveillance video from a Seabrook, New Hampshire police station was leaked, showing police slamming Mike Bergeron face-first into a concrete wall and dousing him with pepper spray while he was on the floor. Bergeron was arrested under suspicion of drunk driving and was unarmed, handcuffed, and relatively calm when one officer decided to violently slam his face into the wall, to the apparent joy of the other officers who could be seen laughing. [78] Incidents like these and many others have signified the donning of a new age - one that is eerily reminiscent of authoritarian societies gone by, draped with violently oppressive, daily interactions between agents of government and the citizenry, and dripping of fascistic notions built upon a culture of militarism and war. A violence historically reserved for the most disenfranchised of the population - and ignored by most of the rest - is finally extending itself beyond the oppressive structures of old, transcending targeted demographics to include a working-class-wide assault.

#### No warrant – violent culture is different from expansive foreign policy­ – what ships the US owns has no effect on whether police will kill black people

### A2 Giroux

#### We should certainly be critically engaged, but if heg is good then educational spaces should teach students to think critically about how to maintain it, not destroy it

#### They don’t solve the way private firms shut down protest, and we are impact turning their protest – this argument isn’t preclusive

### A2 Standard

#### Don’t let them use the standard to exclude offense – it’s obviously impact-justified. If I prove militarism is good vote neg. Prioritize material impacts

Sam Harris 2010. [CEO Project Reason; PHD UCLA Neuroscience; BA Stanford Philosophy]. The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values.” Page 62]

Here is my (consequentialist) starting point: all questions of value (right and wrong, good and evil, etc.) depend upon the possibility of experiencing such value. Without potential consequences at the level of experience—happiness, suffering, joy, despair, etc.—all talk of value is empty. Therefore, to say that an act is morally necessary, or evil, or blameless, is to make (tacit) claims about its consequences in the lives of conscious creatures (whether actual or potential). I am unaware of any interesting exception to this rule. Needless to say, if one is worried about pleasing God or His angels, this assumes that such invisible entities are conscious (in some sense) and cognizant of human behavior. It also generally assumes [and] that it is possible to suffer their wrath or enjoy their approval, either in this world or the world to come. Even within religion, therefore, consequences and conscious states remain the foundation of all values.

#### Reducing the risk of extinction by a tiny amount outweighs massive structural violence.

**Bostrom 12** [Faculty of Philosophy and Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford.], Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority.  Forthcoming book (Global Policy). MP. [http://www.existenti...org/concept.pdf](http://www.existential-risk.org/concept.pdf)Even if we use the most conservative of these estimates, which entirely ignores the   possibility of space colonization and software minds, **we find that the expected loss of an existential  catastrophe is greater than the value of 10^16 human lives**.  **This implies that the expected value of  reducing existential risk by a mere one millionth of one percentage point is at least a hundred times the   value of a million human lives.**  The more technologically comprehensive estimate of 10  54 humanbrain-emulation subjective life-years (or 10  52  lives of ordinary length) makes the same point even   more starkly.  Even if we give this allegedly lower bound on the cumulative output potential of a   technologically mature civilization a mere 1% chance of being correct, we find that the expected   value of reducing existential risk by a mere one billionth of one billionth of one percentage point is worth   a hundred billion times as much as a billion human lives. **One might consequently argue that even the tiniest reduction of existential risk has an   expected value greater than that of the definite provision of any ordinary good, such as the direct   benefit of saving 1 billion lives.**  And, further, that the absolute value of the indirect effect of saving 1  billion lives on the total cumulative amount of existential riskâ€”positive or negativeâ€”is almost   certainly larger than the positive value of the direct benefit of such an action.

### Control of Seas Adv

#### 1. There’s no impact to “control” of the oceans – it’s just a physical space no one lives in – using the word “militarization” doesn’t make it a bad thing

#### 2. Their Deloughrey evidence is horrible – its only warrant is annexation of Micronesia happened over 60 years ago and Micronesia has since gained its independence, which means colonialism isn’t an intrinsic result of naval power

#### 3. Testing is tiny compared to the size of free trade the US navy fosters – testing is in the deep ocean and trade still is maintained in the face of terrorism and piracy

#### 4. Alt cause – their ev says, “State privatization of the seas is nearly synonymous with militarization” – but exclusive economic zones, mapping, and the Law of the Seas are already codified international norms, so loss of heg wouldn’t collapse that

### A2 White Racism

#### No explanation of why ocean transports shapes a racist “geo-imaginary” – racism existed long before mechanized ocean travel

#### Doesn’t solve – the plan only removes navy power, not other forms of ocean transport which their card says causes racism

#### Intervention is inevitable – the aff forces a shift to weaker and bloodier forms of force

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In theory, the United States could refrain from intervening abroad. But, in practice, will it? Many assume today that the American public has had it with interventions, and Alice Rivlin certainly reflects a strong current of opinion when she says that “much of the public does not believe that we need to go in and take over other people’s countries.” That sentiment has often been heard after interventions, especially those with mixed or dubious results. It was heard after the four-year-long war in the Philippines, which cost 4,000 American lives and untold Filipino casualties. It was heard after Korea and after Vietnam. It was heard after Somalia. Yet the reality has been that after each intervention, the sentiment against foreign involvement has faded, and the United States has intervened again. ¶ Depending on how one chooses to count, the United States has undertaken roughly 25 overseas interventions since 1898: Cuba, 1898 The Philippines, 1898-1902 China, 1900 Cuba, 1906 Nicaragua, 1910 & 1912 Mexico, 1914 Haiti, 1915 Dominican Republic, 1916 Mexico, 1917 World War I, 1917-1918 Nicaragua, 1927 World War II, 1941-1945 Korea, 1950-1953 Lebanon, 1958 Vietnam, 1963-1973 Dominican Republic, 1965 Grenada, 1983 Panama, 1989 First Persian Gulf war, 1991 Somalia, 1992 Haiti, 1994 Bosnia, 1995 Kosovo, 1999 Afghanistan, 2001-present Iraq, 2003-present¶ That is one intervention every 4.5 years on average. Overall, the United States has intervened or been engaged in combat somewhere in 52 out of the last 112 years, or roughly 47 percent of the time. Since the end of the Cold War, it is true, the rate of U.S. interventions has increased, with an intervention roughly once every 2.5 years and American troops intervening or engaged in combat in 16 out of 22 years, or over 70 percent of the time, since the fall of the Berlin Wall. ¶ The argument for returning to “normal” begs the question: What is normal for the United States? The historical record of the last century suggests that it is not a policy of nonintervention. This record ought to raise doubts about the theory that American behavior these past two decades is the product of certain unique ideological or doctrinal movements, whether “liberal imperialism” or “neoconservatism.” Allegedly “realist” presidents in this era have been just as likely to order interventions as their more idealistic colleagues. George H.W. Bush was as profligate an intervener as Bill Clinton. He invaded Panama in 1989, intervened in Somalia in 1992—both on primarily idealistic and humanitarian grounds—which along with the first Persian Gulf war in 1991 made for three interventions in a single four-year term. Since 1898 the list of presidents who ordered armed interventions abroad has included William McKinley, Theodore Roose-velt, William Howard Taft, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush. One would be hard-pressed to find a common ideological or doctrinal thread among them—unless it is the doctrine and ideology of a mainstream American foreign policy that leans more toward intervention than many imagine or would care to admit. ¶ Many don’t want to admit it, and the only thing as consistent as this pattern of American behavior has been the claim by contemporary critics that it is abnormal and a departure from American traditions. The anti-imperialists of the late 1890s, the isolationists of the 1920s and 1930s, the critics of Korea and Vietnam, and the critics of the first Persian Gulf war, the interventions in the Balkans, and the more recent wars of the Bush years have all insisted that the nation had in those instances behaved unusually or irrationally. And yet the behavior has continued.¶ To note this consistency is not the same as justifying it. The United States may have been wrong for much of the past 112 years. Some critics would endorse the sentiment expressed by the historian Howard K. Beale in the 1950s, that “the men of 1900” had steered the United States onto a disastrous course of world power which for the subsequent half-century had done the United States and the world no end of harm. But whether one lauds or condemns this past century of American foreign policy—and one can find reasons to do both—the fact of this consistency remains. It would require not just a modest reshaping of American foreign policy priorities but a sharp departure from this tradition to bring about the kinds of changes that would allow the United States to make do with a substantially smaller force structure. ¶ Is such a sharp departure in the offing? It is no doubt true that many Americans are unhappy with the on-going warfare in Afghanistan and to a lesser extent in Iraq, and that, if asked, a majority would say the United States should intervene less frequently in foreign nations, or perhaps not at all. It may also be true that the effect of long military involvements in Iraq and Afghanistan may cause Americans and their leaders to shun further interventions at least for a few years—as they did for nine years after World War I, five years after World War II, and a decade after Vietnam. This may be further reinforced by the difficult economic times in which Americans are currently suffering. The longest period of nonintervention in the past century was during the 1930s, when unhappy memories of World War I combined with the economic catastrophe of the Great Depression to constrain American interventionism to an unusual degree and produce the first and perhaps only genuinely isolationist period in American history. ¶ So are we back to the mentality of the 1930s? It wouldn’t appear so. There is no great wave of isolationism sweeping the country. There is not even the equivalent of a Patrick Buchanan, who received 3 million votes in the 1992 Republican primaries. Any isolationist tendencies that might exist are severely tempered by continuing fears of terrorist attacks that might be launched from overseas. Nor are the vast majority of Americans suffering from economic calamity to nearly the degree that they did in the Great Depression. ¶ Even if we were to repeat the policies of the 1930s, however, it is worth recalling that the unusual restraint of those years was not sufficient to keep the United States out of war. On the contrary, the United States took actions which ultimately led to the greatest and most costly foreign intervention in its history. Even the most determined and in those years powerful isolationists could not prevent it. ¶ Today there are a number of obvious possible contingencies that might lead the United States to substantial interventions overseas, notwithstanding the preference of the public and its political leaders to avoid them. Few Americans want a war with Iran, for instance. But it is not implausible that a president—indeed, this president—might find himself in a situation where military conflict at some level is hard to avoid. The continued success of the international sanctions regime that the Obama administration has so skillfully put into place, for instance, might eventually cause the Iranian government to lash out in some way—perhaps by attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz. Recall that Japan launched its attack on Pearl Harbor in no small part as a response to oil sanctions imposed by a Roosevelt administration that had not the slightest interest or intention of fighting a war against Japan but was merely expressing moral outrage at Japanese behavior on the Chinese mainland. Perhaps in an Iranian contingency, the military actions would stay limited. But perhaps, too, they would escalate. One could well imagine an American public, now so eager to avoid intervention, suddenly demanding that their president retaliate. Then there is the possibility that a military exchange between Israel and Iran, initiated by Israel, could drag the United States into conflict with Iran. Are such scenarios so farfetched that they can be ruled out by Pentagon planners? ¶ Other possible contingencies include a war on the Korean Peninsula, where the United States is bound by treaty to come to the aid of its South Korean ally; and possible interventions in Yemen or Somalia, should those states fail even more than they already have and become even more fertile ground for al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. And what about those “humanitarian” interventions that are first on everyone’s list to be avoided? Should another earthquake or some other natural or man-made catastrophe strike, say, Haiti and present the looming prospect of mass starvation and disease and political anarchy just a few hundred miles off U.S. shores, with the possibility of thousands if not hundreds of thousands of refugees, can anyone be confident that an American president will not feel compelled to send an intervention force to help?¶ Some may hope that a smaller U.S. military, compelled by the necessity of budget constraints, would prevent a president from intervening. More likely, however, it would simply prevent a president from intervening effectively. This, after all, was the experience of the Bush administration in Iraq and Afghanistan. Both because of constraints and as a conscious strategic choice, the Bush administration sent too few troops to both countries. The results were lengthy, unsuccessful conflicts, burgeoning counterinsurgencies, and loss of confidence in American will and capacity, as well as large annual expenditures. Would it not have been better, and also cheaper, to have sent larger numbers of forces initially to both places and brought about a more rapid conclusion to the fighting? The point is, it may prove cheaper in the long run to have larger forces that can fight wars quickly and conclusively, as Colin Powell long ago suggested, than to have smaller forces that can’t. Would a defense planner trying to anticipate future American actions be wise to base planned force structure on the assumption that the United States is out of the intervention business? Or would that be the kind of penny-wise, pound-foolish calculation that, in matters of national security, can prove so unfortunate?¶ The debates over whether and how the United States should respond to the world’s strategic challenges will and should continue. Armed interventions overseas should be weighed carefully, as always, with an eye to whether the risk of inaction is greater than the risks of action. And as always, these judgments will be merely that: judgments, made with inadequate information and intelligence and no certainty about the outcomes. No foreign policy doctrine can avoid errors of omission and commission. But history has provided some lessons, and for the United States the lesson has been fairly clear: The world is better off, and the United States is better off, in the kind of international system that American power has built and defended.

----EXTRA----

#### Isolationism sanctions genocide

Willis 95 (Ellen, Professor of Journalism & Director of Concentraion in Cultural Reporting and Criticism at NYU, The Village Voice, 12-19-95)

If intellectuals are more inclined to rise to the discrete domestic issue than the historic international moment, this may have less to do with the decay of the notion of international solidarity than with the decay of confidence in their ability to change the world, not to mention the decay of anything resembling a coherent framework of ideas within which to understand it. Certainly the received ideas of the left, to the extent that a left can still be said to exist, have been less than helpful as a framework for understanding the Bosnian crisis or organizing a response to it. Although the idea of American imperialism explains less and less in a world where the locus of power is rapidly shifting to a network of transnational corporations, it still fuels a strain of reflexive anti-interventionist sentiment whose practical result is paralyzed dithering in the face of genocide. Floating around "progressive" circles and reinforcing the dithering is a brand of vulgar pacifism whose defining characteristic is not principled rejection of violence but squeamish aversion to dealing with it. In the academy in particular, entrenched assumptions about identity politics and cultural relativism promote a view of the Balkan conflict as too complicated and ambiguous to allow for choosing sides. If there is no such thing as universality, if multiethnic democracy is not intrinsically preferable to ethnic separatism, if there are no clear-cut aggressors and victims but merely clashing cultures, perhaps ethnic partition is simply the most practical way of resolving those "implacable ancient rivalries."

#### That’s morally unacceptable

Isaac 02 [Jeffrey C. Isaac (Professor of Political Science at Indiana-Bloomington, Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life, PhD from Yale). “Ends, Means, and Politics.” Dissent Magazine, Vol. 49, Iss. 2, 2002]

As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military intervention is an act of "aggression," but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime--the Taliban--that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most "peace" activists would prefer not to ask: What should be done to respond to the violence of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime? What means are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended and important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how diplomacy or international law can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power. Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

#### No risk of endless warfare

Gray 7—Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies and Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, graduate of the Universities of Manchester and Oxford, Founder and Senior Associate to the National Institute for Public Policy, formerly with the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Hudson Institute (Colin, July, “The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration”, <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ssi10561/ssi10561.pdf>)

7. A policy that favors preventive warfare expresses a futile quest for absolute security. It could do so. Most controversial policies contain within them the possibility of misuse. In the hands of a paranoid or boundlessly ambitious political leader, prevention could be a policy for endless warfare. However, the American political system, with its checks and balances, was designed explicitly for the purpose of constraining the executive from excessive folly. Both the Vietnam and the contemporary Iraqi experiences reveal clearly that although the conduct of war is an executive prerogative, in practice that authority is disciplined by public attitudes. Clausewitz made this point superbly with his designation of the passion, the sentiments, of the people as a vital component of his trinitarian theory of war. 51 It is true to claim that power can be, and indeed is often, abused, both personally and nationally. It is possible that a state could acquire a taste for the apparent swift decisiveness of preventive warfare and overuse the option. One might argue that the easy success achieved against Taliban Afghanistan in 2001, provided fuel for the urge to seek a similarly rapid success against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. In other words, the delights of military success can be habit forming. On balance, claim seven is not persuasive, though it certainly contains a germ of truth. A country with unmatched wealth and power, unused to physical insecurity at home—notwithstanding 42 years of nuclear danger, and a high level of gun crime—is vulnerable to demands for policies that supposedly can restore security. But we ought not to endorse the argument that the United States should eschew the preventive war option because it could lead to a futile, endless search for absolute security. One might as well argue that the United States should adopt a defense policy and develop capabilities shaped strictly for homeland security approached in a narrowly geographical sense. Since a president might misuse a military instrument that had a global reach, why not deny the White House even the possibility of such misuse? In other words, constrain policy ends by limiting policy’s military means. This argument has circulated for many decades and, it must be admitted, it does have a certain elementary logic. It is the opinion of this enquiry, however, that the claim that a policy which includes the preventive option might lead to a search for total security is **not at all convincing**. Of course, folly in high places is always possible, which is one of the many reasons why popular democracy is the superior form of government. It would be absurd to permit the fear of a futile and dangerous quest for absolute security to preclude prevention as a policy option. Despite its absurdity, this rhetorical charge against prevention is a stock favorite among prevention’s critics. It should be recognized and dismissed for what it is, a debating point with little pragmatic merit. And strategy, though not always policy, **must be nothing if not pragmatic**.

### A2 NP = Militarism

#### This evidence is deceptively highlighted – the “nuclear sites” their card cites are nuclear WEAPONS TESTING not nuclear power production – the other impacts are about new uranium-coated bullets, international arms provision, and uranium gas – none of which the aff solves

#### Nuclear power doesn’t cause prolif

Harack 10 – writes for vision of earth (Ben Harack, “Does nuclear power lead to weapons proliferation?” September 5, 2010<http://www.visionofearth.org/featured-articles/does-nuclear-power-lead-to-weapons-proliferation/>) RMT

Not all used nuclear fuel material is suitable for bombs, particularly the materials found in spent reactor fuel that has undergone a full cycle of use in a reactor. A variety of plutonium and uranium isotopes, the usual materials used to form the core of a nuclear warhead, are found in spent nuclear fuel. The issue is that they are quite difficult to separate from the rest of the material. It possible to do, but not easy. Making a bomb out of used fuel is not a simple process. Current techniques require sizable infrastructure for refining the fuel and extracting the plutonium. This is the sort of industry that the United Nations Security Council keeps a close eye on in the world today. There are very few nations with the scientific and industrial base necessary to build this sort of industry who do not already have nuclear weapons or have chosen to not create them. This is a point often missed by people who lobby against using nuclear power or nuclear fuel reprocessing. They do not realize that a large part of the developed world has both the technical affluence and the available physical resources to create nuclear weapons and yet have chosen not to. The ‘nuclear club’, those nations who possess nuclear weapons is only composed of The United States, Russia, The United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea and probably Israel. There are many wealthy nations that possess nuclear power plants who do not have nuclear weapons such as Canada, Germany, Japan, Finland, South Korea and many others. For the full list see Wikipedia’s article on Nuclear Power By Country. These countries have chosen to use their technical ability to create prosperity rather than weapons. This is important because these countries demonstrate that it is by no means a certainty that development of nuclear power technologies leads to availability of weapons.

#### They didn’t read a prolif impact – merely calling it “violence” is linguistic trickery and doesn’t show why it’s actually bad – prolif isn’t dangerous because deterrence ensures countries won’t use it

#### Heg solves prolif

Tooley 2015. [Graduate from Georgetown University, Work at the CIA]. “American Nuclear Disarmament Will Not Leave the World Safer or Holier.” *The American Spectato*r. MCM.

Much of the security of the world relies on the U.S. nuclear umbrella, which continues to deter, protect, and intimidate. Doubtless China would vastly expand its own relatively minimal nuclear arsenal and seek parity at least with Russia absent overwhelming U.S. power. Russia’s nuclear arsenal is engorged far beyond its strategic needs, and that arsenal has in fact been blessed by the Russian Orthodox Church, which evidently also falls outside the “ecumenical consensus.” Some religious idealists imagine that disarming the West, mainly the U.S., will inspire and motivate the world to follow suit**.** Such expectation is based on a fundamentally and dangerously false view of global statecraft and human nature. The power vacuum that American disarmament would create would inexorably lead to a far more dangerous and unstable world where nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction would exponentially proliferate. American military and nuclear hegemony for the last 70 years has sustained an historically unprecedented approximate global peace and facilitated an even more unprecedented global prosperity. There is indeed a moral and strategic imperative for America today, which is to deploy its power against further nuclear proliferation and to deter aggression by current nuclear actors, while also developing technologies and defensive weapons that neutralize nuclear armaments. If Iran’s genocidally ambitious regime is in the end prevented from nuclearizing, it will only be thanks to American power. And if it does nuclearize, only American and Israeli nukes, perhaps joined by Saudi nukes, will deter its murderous designs. Christian teaching and humanity should demand no less.

### A2 Heg Unsustainable

#### Unipolarity is sustainable – military and nuclear deterrence ensure it and no impact to economic challengers

Monteiro, Yale Political Science Professor, 11

[Nuno P., April 25, 2011, “Balancing Act: Why Unipolarity May Be Durable,” <http://irworkshop.sites.yale.edu/sites/default/files/Monteiro_IRW.pdf>, p. 24-25, accessed 7/6/13, WD]

Debate on unipolar durability has generated great controversy, placing it at the center of scholarship on unipolarity. This prominent place stems from two factors driving scholarly concerns. First, having failed to predict the end of the Cold War -- arguably the most momentous transformation of the international system since the emergence of IR as a scientific discipline in the post-WWII years -- IR scholars are determined to “get it right” next time. 69 Second, systemic theory has always placed a great emphasis on balance-of-power mechanisms, creating an expectation that unipolarity (a systemic imbalance of power) would last only briefly until other great powers (re)emerged. Accordingly, a durable unipolar system poses a serious theoretical challenge, emphasizing the importance of the durability question. 70 In response to this challenge, two views have emerged. Declinists predict the inevitable, nay, impending end of our unipolar world. Primacists argue that, on the contrary, US-led unipolarity is here to stay. In this paper, I make three central claims. First, I argue that neither declinists nor primacists -- both of which focus on latent, economic power -- are looking at the right variable to predict the durability of a unipolar world. Unipolarity is a description of the balance of military, not economic power. For as long as the US military remains unchallenged, the world will remain unipolar regardless of the relative size of the US economy. Second, I argue that the distribution of military power is independent from the distribution of economic power. In other words, balancing will only result in a change in the systemic balance of power when the latter is required to guarantee state survival. That is the case in a conventional world. But in a nuclear world, possession of a small but robust nuclear arsenal virtually guarantees survival. Therefore, rising economic powers may, in a nuclear world, achieve the primary goal of balancing short of effecting a systemic balance of power. This means that, in a nuclear world, unipolarity is in principle durable. Third, I argue that whether rising economic powers in a nuclear world will continue to balance past the point at which their survival is ensured by a robust nuclear deterrent depends on the strategy of the unipole towards their economic growth. If the unipole accommodates their economic growth, rising powers have no incentive to continue balancing past that point, making unipolarity durable. If, however, the unipole takes actions that contain their economic growth, then rising powers have an incentive to continue balancing, ultimately leading to the end of a unipolar world. My theory thus draws attention to the logical separation between theories of balancing and balance-of-power theories. The goals of balancing may successfully be achieved without any transformations in the systemic balance of power. Such is the case in a nuclear unipolar world. While states will balance against a unipolar power regardless of its strategy by acquiring survivable nuclear arsenals, the fact that they can guarantee their survival by doing so frees them from the need to pursue a shift in the systemic balance of power in order to guarantee this aim. This argument has important policy implications. First of all, it gives the unipole significant agency in determining the durability of a unipolar world. Rather than being at the mercy of differential rates of economic growth, a unipole in a nuclear world is fully in control of whether its military power preponderance lasts. Its policies vis-à-vis major powers’ economic growth thus acquire a central place in the toolkit with which it manages the systemic balance of military power. Second, my argument suggests that unipolarity presents particular incentives for nuclear proliferation. But, as Robert Jervis has noted, the spread of nuclear weapons -- the nuclear revolution -- brings with it a decreased salience for the systemic balance of power. For a nuclear power, the systemic balance of power no longer necessarily determines its chances of survival. On the transformational character of proliferation in a unipolar world, Jervis writes: This raises the question of what would remain of a unipolar system in a proliferated world. The American ability to coerce others would decrease but so would its need to defend friendly powers that would now have their own deterrents. The world would still be unipolar by most measures and considerations, but many countries would be able to protect themselves, perhaps even against the superpower. How they would use this increased security is far from clear, however. They might intensify conflict with neighbors because they no longer fear all-out war, or, on the contrary, they might be willing to engage in greater co-operation because the risks of becoming dependent on others would be reduced. In any event, the polarity of the system may become less important. Unipolarity -- at least under current circumstances -- may then have within it the seeds if not of its own destruction, then at least of its modification, and the resulting world would pose interesting challenges to both scholars and national leaders. 71 More broadly, my theory highlights what is perhaps the key dilemma faced by a unipolar power. It may attempt to contain the economic growth of other states, thus remaining the most powerful state in terms of latent power, but triggering a balancing effort that may ultimately undermine its preeminence in military power. Or it may accommodate other states’ economic growth, thus avoiding a military challenge and maintaining its preeminence in military power, but eventually losing its place as the most powerful economy in the system. In other words, military unipolarity is durable only at the expense of economic hegemony.